Bossy Lobster

A blog by Danny Hermes; musing on tech, mathematics, etc.

Edit on GitHub

Reading Istio Secrets

Adopting a service mesh like Istio is a huge undertaking. (Let's set aside for this discussion whether it's a good idea to undertake.) A fairly common issue when getting a mesh up and running is misconfiguration. When trying to debug and determine where and how things are misconfigured, the network is usually not an ally.


The Plan

A common option when "the network is broken" and we're flying blind is to use a packet sniffer to debug. On a development machine, that'd probably be Wireshark. In Kubernetes, ksniff is a popular tool to capture packets and send them back to a development machine for inspection. However, when the connections are encrypted with TLS, captured packets are not so useful. For "modern" TLS connections, Wireshark requires a client random data for the session (see SSLKEYLOGFILE) and the private key that encrypted the traffic.

In this post, we'll be grabbing the private key from a Kubernetes container in an Istio service mesh to aid in a debugging process. This is something a cluster administrator would be doing, not an every day thing and not something a "service owner" would be expected to do. I am writing this up because I was frustrated by lack of materials found when searching how to do this.

Envoy and Existing Support

Kubernetes containers in the Istio service mesh run a sidecar container with Envoy proxy running. In most cases, this sidecar runs in iptables mode. In this mode, it tells the Linux kernel (via iptables) that Envoy will be handling all1 network traffic in the pod. In other words, Envoy has full control of the network for any workload it is running next to as a sidecar.

The Envoy traffic tap feature exists for capturing potentially encrypted packets in a .pcap file2. See the Solving Microservice Mysteries With Envoy's Tap Filter for a pretty great explainer on using traffic tap.

It would be perfectly fine to just stop here and say "use traffic tap". However, I kept pulling the thread. At the end of the day, traffic tap is white box / clear box debugging into the known behavior of Envoy. However, one of the primary use cases of packet capture is to do black box debugging of unknown or unexpected behavior. So in some sense they are at odds.

Istio and mTLS

One of the primary wins for a service mesh is enhanced security and zero trust networking. By requiring workloads to communicate via mutual TLS (mTLS), the underlying Kubernetes network (and the cloud provider VPC it sits on top of) will only see TLS packets that have been mutually verified.

Due to the use of mTLS, it's crucial that every workload (i.e. pod) in the mesh has a unique private key and X.509 public certificate. This pair is used as proof of identity when negotiating mTLS connections. So getting access to the key for a given workload is crucial to decrypting the traffic.

Running the Script

Luckily Envoy has created an incredibly good idea: the xDS protocol. The x stands for "anything here" and the DS for "discovery service". The whole idea underpinning xDS is that different types of configuration are relevant (and changing over time) to an Envoy proxy server. The ability to discover and listen for configuration updates over a range of topics is incredibly useful for a running server. This protocol is making traction directly into gRPC as a way to have all of the benefits of dynamic configuration without the need for a proxy sidecar.

The xDS protocol includes SDS — secrets discovery service — which we'll utilize to grab our private key. The istio-sds.go script facilitates this in several steps.

Determine Envoy Node ID

Invoke GET /server_info in the Envoy admin API to determine the command_line_options.service_node (i.e. the workload or pod identifier according to Envoy).

[email protected]:/# curl http://localhost:15000/server_info
 "version": "73f240a29bece92a8882a36893ccce07b4a54664/1.13.1-dev/Clean/RELEASE/BoringSSL",
 "state": "LIVE",
 "hot_restart_version": "11.104",
 "command_line_options": {
  "service_node": "router~",
  "service_zone": "",
  "mode": "Serve",
 "uptime_current_epoch": "2424451s",
 "uptime_all_epochs": "2424451s"

Connect to Secrets Discovery Service (SDS)

Open a gRPC connection to the /etc/istio/proxy/SDS UDS that is mounted in the istio-proxy sidecar container. As the /SDS in the socket name indicates, this is the secrets discovery service.

ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
// ...
conn, err := grpc.Dial(target, grpc.WithInsecure(), grpc.WithBlock())
// ...
c := discoveryv2.NewSecretDiscoveryServiceClient(conn)

Fetch Secret(s) for Current Envoy Node

Call the FetchSecrets RPC method with the field set to the command_line_options.service_node workload identifier

request := &apiv2.DiscoveryRequest{Node: &corev2.Node{Id: serviceNode}}
response, err := c.FetchSecrets(ctx, request, grpc.Header(&header), grpc.Trailer(&trailer))

Parse the Response

Ensure the type_url in the response indicates a envoy.api.v2.auth.Secret and then parse the protobuf Any in the resources[0] field as a secret:

secret := &authv2.Secret{}
err := ptypes.UnmarshalAny(response.Resources[0], secret)
// ...
tc := secret.GetTlsCertificate()
cc := tc.GetCertificateChain()
// ...
ccBytes := cc.GetInlineBytes()
pk := tc.GetPrivateKey()
// ...
pkBytes := pk.GetInlineBytes()

Putting It All Together

Running the script on an Istio / Envoy sidecar will (almost certainly) require building the binary on a different machine since the container won't have the toolchain installed3. First build the binary:

$ GOARCH=amd64 GOOS=linux go build -o istio-sds-linux-amd64 ./istio-sds.go

then copy it into the container

$ kubectl cp \
>   --namespace testing \
>   --container istio-proxy \
>   ./istio-sds-linux-amd64 \
>   some-istio-workload-748cc777bc-mvqcf:/usr/local/bin/istio-sds-linux-amd64

Finally, run the binary in the istio-proxy container to see both the (public) certificate chain and the private key:

$ kubectl exec \
>   --stdin --tty \
>   --namespace testing \
>   --container istio-proxy \
>   some-istio-workload-748cc777bc-mvqcf \
>   -- /usr/local/bin/istio-sds-linux-amd64
19:53:34.710854 istio-sds.go:50:  GET http://localhost:15000/server_info
19:53:34.713220 istio-sds.go:197: Service Node: "router~"
19:53:34.713247 istio-sds.go:200: Target: "unix:///etc/istio/proxy/SDS"
19:53:34.990037 istio-sds.go:211:
19:53:34.990069 istio-sds.go:212: DiscoveryResponse.VersionInfo: "09-04 19:53:34.715"
19:53:34.990097 istio-sds.go:213: DiscoveryResponse.TypeUrl: ""
19:53:34.990128 istio-sds.go:176: DiscoveryResponse.Resources[0].GetTlsCertificate()
19:53:34.990145 istio-sds.go:177:   GetCertificateChain():
19:53:34.990164 istio-sds.go:179:     -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
19:53:34.990179 istio-sds.go:179:     ...
19:53:34.990421 istio-sds.go:179:     -----END CERTIFICATE-----
19:53:34.990428 istio-sds.go:179:     -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
19:53:34.990435 istio-sds.go:179:     ...
19:53:34.990634 istio-sds.go:179:     -----END CERTIFICATE-----
19:53:34.990647 istio-sds.go:179:
19:53:34.990661 istio-sds.go:181:   GetPrivateKey():
19:53:34.990706 istio-sds.go:183:     -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
19:53:34.990716 istio-sds.go:183:     ...
19:53:34.991035 istio-sds.go:183:     -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
19:53:34.991049 istio-sds.go:183:
  1. Not all, really most
  2. The file format used by Wireshark and tcpdump
  3. If the entire filesystem in the sidecar is read-only, it's impossible to kubectl cp a pre-built binary into the container